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A JUDICIAL POSTSCRIPT TO THE CHURCH-STATE 
DEBATES OF 1989: HOW POROUS THE WALL, 
HOW CIVIL THE STATE? 
WILLIAM vAN ALSTYNE* 
I. 
Since the presentation of the papers in this Symposium, 
the Supreme Court has written still another decision pertinent 
to its subject. In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, 1 delivered on the last day of the 1988-89 Term, the 
Court provided a strong clue as to where the debate now seems 
to be headed. Some brief comment on that decision may serve 
as an updating postscript to the principal papers presented 
here. Judging by the quite polarized opinions written in County 
of Allegheny, we may yet be headed for more conflict, rather than 
less. For the moment, a single Justice, Justice O'Connor, holds 
center stage. Formerly she has been most usually associated 
quite closely with Chief Justice Rehnquist's views. Now, as 
others had already seen in her earlier work, something is devel-
oping of a more independent course. Here, roughly speaking, 
with every hope of encouraging the substantiality of the posi-
tion she has come to represent, is how it momentarily plays out 
on the current Court. 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy have succeeded to the posi-
tions formerly held by Warren Burger and Lewis Powell 
(allowing for Justice Rehnquist's move from his Associate Jus-
tice position to that of Chief Justice). Each of them, it now 
seems reasonably clear, is uninterested in maintaining anything 
even roughly like the rigor of the original Everson doctrine,2 the 
doctrine that spoke for all nine Justices of the Supreme Court 
when it first appeared four decades ago, in 194 7. Neither of 
the newest Justices seems to feel the pull of the Madison-Jeffer-
son view of the first amendment, moreover, in nearly the 
degree as did Justice Powell. With Justice Rehnquist now pre-
siding as Chief Justice, and with Justice White roughly conge-
nial to Justice Rehnquist's highly limited view of the 
* Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. 
1. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989). 
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (quoted infra, 
note 6). 
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establishment clause-a limited view evidently shared by Jus-
tices Scalia and Kennedy as well-there is good reason to see 
the Court as a Court generally divided four-to-four in a categori-
cal, and not merely in a line-drawing, fashion. 
Eight of the nine Justices are deadlocking over essentials, 
and not simply over details. Here, quite equivalently to what 
also appears to have occurred in the abortion field during this 
last term of the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor holds crucial 
ground.3 What is at stake, moreover, is more than her vote. 
Rather, it is a question of her constitutional attitude that one is 
most appropriately interested to understand. In County of Alle-
gheny, it comes through quite distinctly and well. Overall, 
moreover, for those inclined to think that Madison and Jeffer-
son were substantially sound in the shared perspectives they 
held of the first amendment-to maintain a civil government of 
civil equals, fully to respect religious liberty but not to confuse 
it with civil government-this most recent case is a sign of good 
health. 
County of Allegheny is a reprise on Lynch v. Donnelly.4 Like 
Lynch, it, too, is decided by a vote of five-to-four. By this nar-
row mqjority, distinguishing the facts from those in Lynch, the 
Court has held that where a municipality installs a complete 
Nativity Scene inside its Hall of Justice, dominating the princi-
pal staircase with an unmistakable seriousness of physical pres-
ence and official endorsement, the city's subsidy, entanglement 
and involvement have come finally too far. 5 
The controlling vote in the case was cast by Justice 
O'Connor, affirming the lower court which had itself limited 
the license of Lynch v. Donnelly, as nearly every other lower fed-
eral court had also done. To be sure, it is Justice Blackmun, 
rather than Justice O'Connor, who writes the lead opinion 
announcing the judgment of the Supreme Court in the County 
of Allegheny case. He begins early on by quoting the strong and 
familiar language from Everson v. Board of Education. 6 He also 
3. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
4. 465 u.s. 668 (1984). 
5. However, the same case also holds (by a different five-lo-four 
majority of course) that the city's installation of a giant menorah furnished by 
one Jewish sect, Chabad, immediately outside the city-county building a block 
away, when accompanied by a gianl Christmas tree furnished by the city, is all 
right. 
6. The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment 
means al leasl this: Neither a stale nor the Federal Government can 
sel up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor 
influence a person lo go lo or remain away from church against his 
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invokes the implementing three-part Lemon test Professor 
Esbeck has explored in his paper. 7 It is Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence, lifted from Lynch v. Donnelly, however, that domi-
nates even what Justice Blackmun writes. 8 And it essentially 
resonates to a principle both Madison and Jefferson shared. 
The suggestion ventured by Justice O'Connor in Lynch, 
and applied in County of Allegheny, is recalled in her separate 
opinion in County of Allegheny, in the following way: 
In my concurrence in Lynch, I suggested a clarification of 
our Establishment Clause doctrine to reinforce the con-
cept that the Establishment Clause "prohibits govern-
ment from making adherence to a religion relevant in any 
way to a person's standing in the political community .... 
[The establishment clause prohibits government from 
sending] a message to nonadherents that they are outsid-
ers, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insid-
ers, favored members of the political community. "9 
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No 
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious 
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No 
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or 
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither 
a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and 
vice versa. [In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of 
separation between church and State."] 
Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). (The original closing 
sentence from Everson appears here in brackets; in County of Allegheny, Justice 
Blackmun dropped it out.) 
7. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). According to this test, the 
state action challenged on establishment clause grounds must reflect some 
secular purpose, yield primarily a secular effect, and not involve undue 
entanglement of government and religion. The latter two parts of that test 
were deemed principally implicated in the County of Allegheny case. 
8. See, e.g., 109 S. Ct. at 3100-02. 
9. /d. at 3118. In his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments (1785), James Madison remonstrated against the incorporation of 
religion within the practices of the civil state. He noted that it "degrades 
from the equal rank of Citizens" those identified thereby as strangers; it 
produces a "tendency to banish our Citizens." Madison, Memorial and 
Remonstrance, reprinted in 5 THE FouNDERS' CoNSTITUTION 8 (P. Kurland & R. 
Lerner ed. 1787). Similarly, in the BILL FOR EsTABLISHING RELIGious 
FREEDOM, adopted by the Virginia Assembly following Madison's campaign, 
the BILL took care to declare that no one's opinion in matters of religions 
"shall in [any] wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities." 
Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), reprinted in id. at 77. It 
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Justice Blackmun correspondingly absorbs that suggestion 
within his opinion for himself, Stevens, Marshall, and Bren-
nan. 10 Indeed, he incorporates it to decide the case: 
Our [decisions subsequent to Lemon v. Kurtzman] fur-
ther have refined the definition of governmental action 
that unconstitutionally advances religion. In recent 
years, we have paid particularly close attention to 
whether the challenged governmental practice either has 
the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion .... 
Whether the key word is "endorsement," "favorit-
ism," or "promotion," the essential principle remains the 
same. The Establishment Clause, at the very least, pro-
hibits government from appearing to take a position on 
questions of religious belief or from "making adherence 
to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in 
the political community." 
Although justice O'Connor joined the majority opin-
ion in Lynch, she wrote a concurrence that differs in sig-
nificant respects from the majority opinion. The main 
requires no particular sophistication to appreciate the pertinence of these 
observations to Justice O'Connor's observations in County of Allegheny. 
(Indeed, they were applicable also to Lynch.) See, e.g., Redlich, Nativity Ruling 
Insults jews, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1984, at A19, col. 2; see also Van Alstyne, 
What is a Law Respecting "An Establishment of Religion"?, 65 N.C.L. REv. 909, 
913-16 (1987). 
10. These were, of course, the four dissenting Justices in Lynch. All four 
tend to hold fairly strongly to the Madison-Jefferson view of the church-state 
clauses of the first amendment. The Chief Justice, Justice White, and now 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy (in this respect different from Justice Powell, who 
overall came closer to his Virginia intellectual history of Madison and 
Jefferson than to the New England view), have pretty well announced a 
repudiating of Madison and Jefferson for a preference barely short-if short 
at all-of Justice Story's view that our government may affirmatively report 
and reflect its judeo-Christian (very small 'j," very large "C") founding in its 
actions, its laws, its appropriations, and its own internal, official and unofficial 
conduct. See, e.g., 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 627-34 (M. Bigelow 5th ed. 1891) (1833) ("[I]t is impossible 
for those who believe in the truth of Christianity as a divine revelation to 
doubt that it is the especial duty of government to foster and encourage it 
among all the citizens and subjects .... The real difficulty lies in ascertaining 
the limits to which government may rightfully go in fostering and 
encouraging religion. . . . The real object of the amendment was not to 
countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity 
by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, 
and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to 
a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government."). 
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difference is that the concurrence provides a sound ana-
lytical framework for evaluating governmental use of reli-
gious symbols. 11 
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While not framed as Madison or Jefferson would necessarily 
have put it, it comes close enough in the end. 
II. 
In sharp contrast, Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and 
for Justices Rehnquist, White, and Scalia, is essentially a pole 
widely apart from this view. For Justice Kennedy, the control-
ling point, so far as the establishment clause is concerned, 
seems to be that no one is being religiously coerced (in any 
obvious way) or even "proselytized" (in their view) by the state. 
Picking up from Chief Justice Burger's earlier opinion in Lynch 
v. Donnelly, these Justices, now cast into a momentary dissent-
ing role (insofar as in this case they failed to hold Justice 
O'Connor), have no difficulty at all accepting the city's actions 
in County of Allegheny. The position they take is bolstered, they 
say, by past instances of what they regard as widely accepted 
practice. The city's actions thus easily meet the former Chief 
Justice's, barrier-clearing, "no more than" test as he had out-
lined that test in Lynch v. Donnelly. 12 Justice Kennedy finds that 
that test fits this case quite nicely in the following way: 13 
11. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. al 3100-02 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly 
465 U.S. 668, 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
12. For a critical review and discussion of this "test," see Van Alstyne, 
Trends in the Supreme court: Mr. Jefferson s Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 1984 DuKE LJ. 770, 782-87. 
13. The following quotation reproduced here is reproduced lo call 
auenlion lo its technique, and nol lo suggest lhal the comparisons il offers 
are true. Indeed, every example employed to make Marsh look plausible 
within existing case Jaw is uuerly distinguishable in terms of the opinion 
actually discussing that example. Not one comes within a ballpark of Marsh. 
Properly lax exemption of religiously-held properly, in common with such 
status for other nonprofit-held properly, as was involved in the case actually 
decided by the Supreme Court, is not inconsistent with Everson or with the 
Madison-Jefferson view; no such thing can be said with respect to laking 
money by laxation lO pay sectarian ministers conducting prayers agreeable lo 
the dominant religion(s) of those who thus appropriate money from the 
public fisc lo hear prayers said. See the strong criticism by Madison of this 
practice in his Detached Memoranda (CA. 1817), reprinted in 5 THE FoUNDERs' 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, al 103. Compare Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 
664 (1970) (especially Justice Harlan's opinion) with Marsh v. Chambers, 463 
U.S. 783 (1983). Similarly, Justice Kennedy's comparison of Marsh with 
Everson is even more far-fetched. Reimbursement of parents for ordinary bus 
fare on the usual municipal transit line on a neutral basis in order for their 
children lo reach school safely each day, regardless of the nature of the 
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[l]n Marsh v. Chambers, we found that Nebraska's practice 
of employing a legislative chaplain did not violate the 
Establishment Clause, because [in our view] "legislative 
prayer present[ed] no more potential for establishment 
than the provision of school transportation, beneficial 
grants for higher education, or tax exemptions for reli-
gious organizations." Non-coercive government action 
within the realm of flexible accommodation or passive 
acknowledgment of existing symbols does not violate the 
Establishment Clause unless it benefits religion in a way 
more direct and more substantial than practices that are 
accepted in our national heritage. 14 
This passage pretty well absorbs Justice Story's views de facto (if 
not quite de jure). 15 It can be best appreciated by fitting it with 
the observations offered in explaining the majority position in 
Lynch, observations such as they were, by Chief Justice Burger, 
on whose Lynch opinion Justice Kennedy firmly relies. So, just 
as a brief, comparative flashback to the opinion in Lynch v. Don-
nelly, here is how Chief Justice Burger similarly found no estab-
lishment clause problem with an outdoor park display of a city-
owned, compulsory-taxpayer-maintained sectarian nativity 
scene cum Santa Claus, in 1984: 
Of course the creche is identified with one religious faith 
but no more so than the example we have set out from prior 
cases .... 16 
We can assume, arguendo, that the display advances 
religion ... ; [but] whatever [the] benefit to one faith ... [,] 
display of the creche is no more an advancement or 
school each child may attend, involves no tax paid to any religion, to any 
church, or to any parochial school. Neither, of course, were the buses owned, 
operated, controlled, or governed by any religion or church. (Compare 
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) with Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S. 229 (1977).) The grants sustained in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 
(1971 ), were indeed grants for "higher education," in the Court's view of the 
particular case, and for nothing else. Nothing of the sort can be said of 
Marsh. When Justice Kennedy speaks of practices that are "accepted" in our 
National heritage, id. at 3138, one is entitled to ask, "accepted" by whom? 
See, for example, the views of Jefferson on one such "accepted" practice in 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller Oan. 23, 1808), reprinted 
in 5 THE FouNDERs' CoNSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 98. As to the "practices" 
Justice Kennedy thus identifies as "accepted," note how the proposition is 
then slipped sidewise, as it were, leading to judicial approval of still more-
and-more-and-more such "practices" as they spill out of government virtually 
as from an official church. 
14. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3138 (citations omitted). 
15. See supra note I 0. 
16. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (emphasis added). 
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endorsement of religion than the Congressional and 
Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself 
as "Christ's Mass" .... 17 
Prior to this, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that, 
[T]o conclude that the primary effect of including the 
creche is to advance religion in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause would require that we view it as more bene-
ficial to and more an endorsement of religion ... than ... 
[specific forms of assistance previously allowed such as 
textbook loans to parochial schools and bus fare reim-
bursements, or] more of an endorsement of religion than 
the Sunday Closing Laws upheld in McGowan v. Mary-
land . .. [or the payment of chaplain salaries sustained in 
March v. ChambersV 8 
565 
When it first appeared this way, in Lynch, this "no more 
than" test seemed to me to be no help. It moved merely from 
one item to another, eliding, adding, and expanding, as it 
moved. Indeed, I thought then that it invited immediate flag-
ging,t9 to try, in that way, to appeal to Justice Powell, and to do 
so before the Madison-Jefferson view of the establishment 
clause was destroyed, swept away by mass erosion, by the then 
Chief Justice who never wanted that view to govern at all. But 
the apparent straightfaced manner in which it has appeared 
again, this time with two new Justices straightfacedly appearing 
to join in, certainly gives one pause. Do the new Justices, Ken-
nedy and Scalia, really mean to proceed in this way? It appears 
that both indeed do. Yet, both these Justices are able, well-
read, experienced, serious people. Both surely know what they 
are about. The more straightforward explanation of what they 
are about is that they are drawn far more to Justice Story's lean-
ings than to either Madison or to Jefferson. The "no more 
than" test is merely a means of getting from here to there. 
One gets there from here by beginning with some seem-
ingly unprepossessing statement of "our national heritage," for 
example, a congressionally-e~oined, simple, short, executive 
proclamation of national thanksgiving, which no one short of 
some crazed atheist is supposed to be capable of finding objec-
tionable.20 After that, what's really different about (a) altering 
the motto (to make it theistic), (b) using tax revenues for legis-
17. /d. at 683. 
18. /d. 681-82. 
19. See Van Alstyne, supra note 12. 
20. But see Van Alstyne, supra note 12 at 775, for a discussion of 
Jefferson's objections as President to such proclamations. See also Gaylor v. 
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lative chaplains, or (c) a creche in the courthouse itself, or (d), 
(e), (£), (g), and (h)? If one concludes (as one who wants to 
easily can, though falsely) that each add-on is no more relig-
iously-endorsing, no more sect-favoring, and/or no more tax-mis-
appropriative than some previous thing, i.e., if one concludes 
that the first amendment actually frames a "no more than" 
clause rather than a wholly different sort of clause, the game is 
obviously up. The ''accepted" tradition itself expands. It lays 
in its own additional pieces, mosaically, one-by-one. And those 
who felt merely trivially uneasy in the "origins" of these "tradi-
tions," find themselves ever more marginalized as citizens, 
pushed, as it were, to the side. 
Of course, to the extent that all along one earnestly 
believed thatjustice Story's views should have commanded the 
judicial interpretation of the first and fourteenth amendments 
in the first place, one is not likely to be disturbed. For the 
moment, albeit narrowly, we have seen the different tracery of 
Madison and jefferson at work with the Court and especially, or 
rather importantly, with Justice O'Connor. The larger ques-
tion, revisited in the papers Professors Esbeck and Smith have 
given us, is whether the Supreme Court ought to confine civil 
government to civil restraint and to civil means. In my view, it 
surely should, although it cannot succeed without our help. 
Reagan, 553 F. Supp. 356 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (a readable and provocative 
case). 
